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1. Introduction*© 
 
 “... as the representative of the World Bank on the ground, I came under pressure 
from several sources, some of them quite surprising, to release the tranche [loan] 
with minimal attention to conditionality. There was a steady stream of private sector 
representatives, domestic and foreign, arguing for the release of the tranche ... 
because some of them had specific contracts with the government which were 
unlikely to be paid on time if the government did not get the money from the World 
Bank and other donors.” (Kanbur, 2000) 
 
Can companies play a role when donors make their aid disbursement decision, and can 
recipients of foreign assistance make use of such a link? Ravi Kanbur’s (2000) experience 
from Ghana, where the loan tranche was in fact released, indicates that the pressure created 
by companies towards disbursement may be decisive. Even so, the literature on foreign aid 
has ignored these forces, and formal modeling of aid conditionality has almost been absent 
(Drazen, 2000). We develop a model that not only focuses on how companies can influence 
the donors, but also on how strategic recipients can use this interdependence to withhold 
contracts to companies to create such company-pressure on conditionality. 
Foreign aid has been a major income source for the developing countries, and a 
typical low- income country now receives around 7-8 % of their GNP in aid (World Bank 
1998). Large parts of this assistance are made contingent upon the poor country 
implementing certain conditions like macroeconomic stabilizing policies. However, even 
though conditionality is viewed as a necessary instrument for the donor community to 
                                                               
*  Espen Villanger, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Fantoftvegen 38, PO Box 6033, Postterminalen, N-5892 Bergen, 
tel.+4755574000, fax +4755574166, e-mail espen.villanger@cmi.no. 
© Thanks to Kaushik Basu, Magnus Hatlebakk, Ravi Kanbur , Gaute Torsvik and Bertil Tungodden for useful 
advice. 
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achieve the goals of aid (Summers and Pritchett 1993, Kanbur 2000), the empirical 
evidence indicates that conditionality fails (Sachs 1989, World Bank 1992, Mosley et al. 
1995, Collier 1997, Dollar and Svensson 2000). When foreign aid is so important to the 
recipient, why does the recipient not comply with the donor in the face of a cut-off of these 
recourses? And why does the donor disburse the funds to recipients that do not implement 
the conditions when conditionality is vital to the donor’s goals? This is the puzzle that 
Kanbur (2000) termed “the weakness of strength”: Why are the perceived mighty donors 
not able to force the perceived weak recipients to implement the conditions?  
The limited literature that utilizes formal models to explain the failure of aid 
conditionality offers some insight into this puzzle.1 Svensson’s (2000) principal-agent 
model illustrates how altruistic donors end up in the Samaritan’s dilemma because the 
recipient has no incentives to implement conditions to reduce poverty when the amount of 
aid is determined by the level of poverty. A different approach is taken by Mosley et al. 
(1995) in which the relationship between the donor and recipient is modeled as a bargaining 
game. One of their findings is that there will always be some slippage on the conditions, 
even if the recipient has agreed to their implementation in the first round.  
This paper provides a complementary explanation for the failure of conditionality 
by developing a game-theoretic multi-agent model with a recipient, two donors and two 
companies, where the influence of private business interests on the donor-recipient 
relationship can be crucial to the donors’ disbursement dec ision. Most models of foreign 
aid are dyadic, which means that all the agents interact pairwise. Our model is triadic, 
which implies that an agent i (the recipient) does not only take account of his relationship 
                                                               
1 See Drazen (2000) for a survey of the political economy of foreign aid.  Principal-agent models that discuss 
foreign aid include Pedersen (1996) on why it is crucial for the donor to have the first mover advantage if aid 
is to increase investment, and Pedersen (2002) for an illustration of how adverse incentive effects of aid can 
cause poverty to increase due to a Samaritan’s dilemma problem. Another problem that is often mistakenly 
taken to be the failure of conditionality, is that aid can be fungible. For fungibility, see for instance Feyzioglu 
et al. (1996). 
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with agent j (one donor), but also of his own and agent j’s relationship with a third agent k 
(one company).2 We find that one possible explanation for the “weakness of strength” is 
that recipients may be able to play different donors out against each other by granting 
contracts to companies from those donor countries that do not enforce conditionality. This 
creates incentives for the companies to put pressure on the donor to disburse aid, even when 
the conditions are not implemented. We show that if it is more important for the donor to 
maintain a good relationship with the domestic company than to maintain conditionality, 
the recipient need not implement the conditions to receive aid, and conditionality fails. 
The failure of conditionality can only be sustained in our model when we assume 
triadic interactions. Restricting the agents to traditional pairwise interaction removes the 
recipient’s ability to use the company to put pressure on the donor. We show that this 
restriction yields the opposite result, namely that conditionality becomes successful because 
the recipient must implement the conditions to get aid. 
Several studies argue that there are asymmetric preferences between the donor and 
the recipient with regard to the attractiveness of the policy conditions (Mosley et al. 1995, 
Collier et al. 1997, Dollar and Svensson 2000, Kanbur 2000)3. This divergence of opinion 
lies at the heart of conditionality. If there were no disagreement between the donor and the 
recipient on implementation, there would be no need for the donor to threaten to cut off the 
aid if the recipient did not fulfil the obligations. 4 Hence, conditionality would be 
unnecessary because the recipient would implement the conditions anyway. We incorporate 
conditionality into the model as a way for donors to buy reform or new policies that the 
                                                               
2 See Basu (2000) for a discussion of dyads and triads. 
3 The controversy over the policy conditions can arise from the potential redistribution from politically 
important domestic groups that may follow from the implementation of the conditions (Summers and 
Pritchett, 1993, Mosley et al. 1995) 3, or more generally from the cost of exerting effort when implementing 
the conditions. (Svensson 2000). 
4 Note that new positions from a donor on conditionality may reflect nothing else than rhetoric if the donor’s 
preferences are not changed.  The World Bank’s new initiative of making recipients partners in the 
development strategy is just another emperor without clothes if the bank continues to condition aid on the 
same policies as before. 
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recipient would not adhere to in the absence of aid, and let the recipient’s implementation 
be endogenously determined. 
One important motive for giving foreign assistance has been to increase economic 
growth in the recipient country. However, there is some evidence that foreign aid has not 
contributed to growth (Boone 1996), and that sound macroeconomic policies are necessary 
for aid to increase growth (Burnside and Dollar 2000). Hence, as emphasized by World 
Bank (1998), conditioning aid on sound policies is vital for the goals of the donor 
community because aid may be wasted if the right policies are not in place.  
The altruistic “conditionality contributes to growth” argument seems to be the most 
important motive for contemporary donors setting the recipient’s implementation of sound 
macroeconomic policies as a necessary condition for foreign aid (Summers and Pritchett 
1993, Collier et al. 1997).5 Hence, we incorporate this motive for donors to maintain 
conditionality. However, the empirical literature of the determinants of aid points out that 
many donors also let economic self-interests influence aid disbursement, for instance 
through tying aid to contracts with companies from the donor country. 6 So we incorporate 
both the altruistic conditionality motive and a concern for domestic company interests in 
the donor’s preferences. The latter motive is similar to that for tying aid in that the donor 
cares about the domestic economic activities in its own country. Even though we assume 
that donors have an altruistic motive for giving aid, it is necessary to underline that we do 
not use a Samaritan’s dilemma argument for the failure of conditionality.  
 This paper is organized as follows. The empirical background is presented in section 
2, and the model of an extended triadic structure involving one recipient, two donors and 
                                                               
5 Collier et al. (1997) also discuss the other motives for conditionality, and see also Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
for empirical results that indicate that aid increases growth unconditional of “sound” policy.  
6 On the donors taking into account their self-interests when acting on the aid scene, see the empirical work of  
Alesina and Dollar (2000), Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Trumbull and Wall (1994). For a model where a 
selfish donor uses aid to lower trade tariffs, see Lahiri et al. (2002). 
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two northern companies is presented in section 3. A few tentative policy implications are 
discussed in section 4, and section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Empirical background of triads 
Ravi Kanbur’s (2000) experience of a third party (a company) influencing the relationship 
between two agents (the donor and the recipient) is a typical example of a triadic 
relationship, and is a similar structure of influence to what others have found. It is evident, 
as Basu (2000) notes, that triadic relations occur in interactions at the international level, 
especially in situations where sanctioning is an issue. Basu illustrates the necessity of using 
the triadic structure to analyze such sanctions by the US Helms-Burton Act of 1996. The 
US is not only penalizing Cuba by a trade embargo in an usual dyadic relationship, but the 
intent of the Helms-Burton Act is also to penalize any third party, company or country, that 
does business with Cuba.  
Another example of how three-party relationships develop on the international arena 
can be traced to the previous struggle between communism and capitalism. During the cold 
war, it was evident that recipients of foreign aid used this political rivalry between the 
ideologies to play the great powers out against each other in order to extract maximum 
benefits from the two main rivals. It was common knowledge that if the necessary amounts 
of aid were not provided from one of the sides, the recipient could turn to the other side, 
and hence, adhere to the opposite ideology. In US’s own words regarding African 
countries:  
”U.S. policymakers focused on strengthening African ties to the West and on 
providing sufficient U.S. aid to the countries of Africa so that the alternative of 
turning to the Soviet bloc would seem less attractive.” 7 
 
                                                               
7 US Department of State Publication (1999). 
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Such turnover may have induced a loss for the power that lost its supporter because of the 
importance of retaining the spread of the other power’s ideology. If this was the case, then 
the recipient could have employed a strategy where it asked one power for more aid and at 
the same time “accidentally” revealed an interest in the other power’s ideology. This could 
have induced the first power to grant more aid in order to keep the recipient on their side in 
the “battle”. 
An interesting example of a triadic relationship is given by an earlier loan officer in 
an American bank (Gwynne, 1983). The loan officer participated in the process of giving a 
ten million dollars loan to a Philippine construction company, which was technically 
bankrupt. The company had a leverage ratio of seven to one, so the debt was so large 
compared to the equity that no bank would normally grant a loan. Despite its knowledge of 
the huge leverage ratio, the bank granted the loan. The reason was that the loan was to be 
used to purchase equipment from an American company, which was also a long-standing 
client of the bank. The American company put pressure on the loan officer to grant the loan 
so they could get the contract with the Philippine company. The bank gave in to the 
pressure due to the fact that the American company had large demand deposits and pension 
funds deposited in the bank. The relations were so important that even the president of the 
bank intervened to get the loan disbursed. Hence, the loan was granted because of the 
American company’s influence on what was supposed to be an ordinary dyadic relationship 
between the bank and the Philippine company. 
The principle behind a strategy of making a company influence one’s business 
partner can be useful for a recipient in contemporary aid relations. Kanbur’s (2000) 
experience from Ghana indicate that the pressure from companies on the donor can be 
crucial in explaining the failure of conditionality. We know from the literature on tied aid 
that there exist strong relationships between bilateral donors and companies from the donor 
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countries. Hence, we restrict our analysis to bilateral donors because we believe that the 
largest opportunities for company influence can be found in these relations. The multi-
agent triadic model in the next section formalizes these relations.  
Section 3 starts by explaining the main argument in a simple 3-player context, and 
goes on to specify the payoff functions (section 3.1) in order to analyze the game when 
more donors and companies are included (section 3.2). To show that the triadic structure is 
crucial for these results, we make a comparison with the dyadic modeling of the same 
relationships (section 3.3), before turning to a discussion of the properties of the contract 
underlying the analysis (sections 3.4 and 3.5). 
  
3. The model 
Consider a model with one recipient and N donor-company pairs where each company has 
its headquarters in one of the donor countries. Let Donori and Companyi denote the donor 
and the company in country i. We assume that each donor adheres to conditionality, so they 
specify some conditions that the recipient must implement initially in order to be entitled to 
receive aid. Then, in line with the empirical findings on the disagreement on the conditions, 
we have a strategic, maximizing recipient who is not in favor of these conditions and who 
would thus try to get the aid without implementing the conditions. 
In this model, the recipient is going to build a power plant. Let the size of this 
investment be exogenously given and denoted I. All the companies are interested in having 
this project, and the recipient must decide to which company it will give the contract. 
As we know from the literature on tied aid, each company has a close relationship 
with the government in the country where the particular company’s headquarters are 
located. Due to the non-transparency of such relationships, we could treat the company-
donor relationship as a black box and just assume that the company is able to influence its 
donor. However, to visualize the influence, we assume that the company must decide on 
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locating some new activities, and can either locate them in the country where it has its 
headquarters, or abroad. Companyi’s location decision is important for Donori’s domestic 
interests, and assumed to be independent of whether or not Companyi gets a share of the 
power plant contract. 
All players realize that there is an opportunity for the recipient to utilize the 
companies’ influence over the donors to get aid without implementing the conditions. To 
illustrate this argument, assume first that N =1. The relationships are illustrated in figure 1: 
 
Fig. 1. The triadic relationship when N = 1. 
     Recipient 
 
 
 
     Build a power plant                  Aid on conditions 
 
 
 
      Location 
    Company1            Donor1 
     
 
Let the recipient be indifferent to whether Company1 or some other company builds 
the plant, and assume that this “other company” does not have any relations with the other 
agents. Assume further that the recipient acts according to the following “weak reciprocity” 
rule:  
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The recipient will give the construction-assignment to some other company if 
Company1 does not locate abroad in a situation where Donor1 does not disburse 
aid. Otherwise, Company1  gets the contract. 
 
We term this rule “weak reciprocity” because it specifies that if the recipient is indifferent 
between two actions, it will choose the action with the worst result for the company if the 
company does not comply with the recipient’s aim of punishing the donor for not giving 
aid. We will return to this rule and its empirical foundations, but first we illustrate how the 
recipient can use the contract allocation to secure aid without implementing the conditions.  
Take as a starting point that the recipient does not implement the conditions. If 
Donor1 maintains conditionality and hence does not give aid, then the recipient’s contract-
rule creates incentives for Company1 to locate abroad. This illustrates our main point: 
Company1 has incentives to influence Donor1 to disburse aid when the conditions are not 
implemented. Further, make the following two assumptions which are necessary for the 
recipient to be able to get aid without implementing the conditions in this setting. First, the 
contract is worth more to Company1 than locating abroad, i.e. the company will actually 
locate abroad to secure the contract if the donor does not disburse aid. Second, the concern 
for domestic business is more important than conditionality for the donor, i.e. if the donor 
must choose between maintaining conditionality and losing some valuable activities to 
another country, then aid will be disbursed. 
The interaction between these agents is typically sequential. In line with the 
principle of conditionality in the donor-recipient relationship, we assume that the recipient 
has the first-mover advantage.8 So, at stage one, the recipient decides whether or not to 
                                                               
8 Conditionality as practiced in contemporary donor policy implies that the donor awaits the recipient’s 
implementation before taking the disbursement decision, the so-called performance-based aid. As the history 
of conditionality shows, the recipient would never implement controversial conditions if the donor was to take 
this decision before the recipient’s eventual implementation (Collier et al. 1997). Hence, recipients are usually 
modeled as Stackelberger leaders, see for instance Pedersen (1996), Svensson (2000) and Hagen (2001). 
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implement the pre-determined conditions specified by Donor1. At stage two, Donor1 
decides to disburse the aid or not, and, at stage three, Company1 decides on location. 
Finally, at stage four, the recipient decides whether to give the contract to Company1 or to 
some other company. By backward induction in a game with this structure played once, it is 
straightforward to show that the recipient refuses to implement the conditions and that 
Donor1 disburses aid, given the two conditions from the previous paragraph and the 
recipient’s weak reciprocity rule. Figure 2 displays the game tree. 
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Figure 2: The game-tree for the triadic game for N =1. 
 
          Recipient 
 
 
       Not implement conditions    Implement conditions   
  
       Donor1         Donor1 
 
    Give aid   No aid       Give aid      No  aid 
 
 
Company1   Company1                                Company1           Company 1   
 
Abroad           At home       Abroad   At home Abroad         At home Abroad      At home  
 
         recipient               recipient              recipient                        recipient            
                               
0           I         0       I        0      I   0          I    0        I            0       I          0         I            0    I  
     
 
 
 
 The result is dependent on the recipient adhering to its own rule of giving the 
contract to another company if Company1 does not locate abroad if Donor1 rejects 
disbursement of aid, even if the recipient is indifferent to who builds the plant. Under our 
assumptions, the contract-allotting rule secures that Company1 will punish Donor1 by 
locating abroad in case aid is not disbursed. This is because Company1 will lose the 
contract if it does not punish the donor.  
This assumption of weak reciprocity is anchored in an increasing empirical 
literature on the importance attached to the process that generates economic results. In 
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experimental economics, one frequent finding is that people are inclined to punish those 
who do not cooperate, even if this punishment does not imply higher payoff in subsequent 
periods (as with trigger strategies in repeated games). Moreover, experiments indicate that 
many individuals are willing to take on a cost in order to punish non-cooperators, even if 
this does not lead to a higher payoff in subsequent periods (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Ostrom, 
Walker and Gardener 1992). 
In particular, experiments with “ultimatum games”9 reveal that substantial positive 
offers are turned down. Proposals of less than 20% in these games are often rejected (Güth 
and Tietz 1990, Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir 1991, Camerer and Thaler 
1995, Henrich 2000), which implies that people are willing to lose 20% of the money in the 
game as long as the player that proposed the “unfair” share gets nothing.10 Bowles and 
Gintis (2000) interpret these results as reflecting “strong reciprocity”: a behavioral rule to 
reward cooperators and punish those who deviate from norms of acceptable behavior. Our 
assumption of weak reciprocity does not go as far as implying that one is willing to incur a 
net cost of punishing. Rather, weak reciprocity merely implies that a player who is 
indifferent between two actions chooses the action that gives the worst outcome for the 
deviator and best outcome for the cooperator. 
Before we set up the formal conditions for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
more general game in section 3.2, it is necessary to specify the payoff functions for the 
agents.  
 
 
                                                               
9 In an ultimatum game, two players (usually unknown to each other) decide on how to share an amount of 
money between them. One is chosen to propose a share, the “proposer”, and the other one, the “responder” 
decides on whether or not to accept that share. If accepted, the proposed share is allotted to the responder 
while the proposer will have the remainder. But if the offer is rejected, neither of the players get anything. 
10 Low offers are often perceived as “unfair” by both the proposer and the responder, see for example 
Henrich’s (2000) interviews of the players in Los Angeles and Machiguenga, Peru. 
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3.1 Payoff functions  
Donori is interested in granting the recipient conditional aid of size ai. Assume that the 
parliament in the donor country determines the aid budget so that ai > 0 is exogenously 
given. Let a be the vector that represents all the donors’ different amounts of aid; 
),...,,( 21 Naaaa = . The superscript of a indicates whether or not aid is disbursed, so let ai
gra 
and ainot denote that Donori grants or does not grant aid, respectively, and agra and anot that 
every donor’s aid is disbursed or not disbursed. Donor i adheres to conditionality, and thus 
operates with some pre-specified conditions, ci. Let c be the vector of conditions for all 
donors; ),...,,( 21 Ncccc = . Then ci
imp denotes the event that the recipient implements 
Donori’s conditions, and cinot the opposite. Finally, let cimp and cnot denote that every 
donor’s conditions are implemented or not implemented, respectively. For simplicity, and 
to facilitate the comparison between the dyadic and the triadic equilibrium below, assume 
that ci is different from cj  so that each donor has its own conditions.11 For example, one 
donor conditions aid on trade liberalization, one on fiscal deficit, one on military 
expenditures, one on health expenditures and so on. Assume also that each donor’s 
conditions are not conflicting with any of the other donors’ conditions. 
The close relationship between the company and the donor within the same country, 
that is, between Donori and Companyi, can also be specified. The important assumption is 
that Companyi can make decisions that are important to Donori. For illustrative purposes, 
however, assume that Companyi is willing to use location of some new activities as a 
potential means to influence Donor i. If si denotes Companyi’s size of activities in Donori’s 
country, then let s*i be the optimal size, and let sui <  s*i denote the size of Companyi‘s 
activities if it does not locate the ne w activities to country i. Let Ii denote Companyi‘s share 
                                                               
11 It is evident from the analysis below that the results do not depend on whether or not the donors have 
overlapping conditions.  
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of the construction contract I. Thus, if I is divided equally among the N companies, then 
N
I
I i = . Then if Companyi does not get a share of the contract, 0=iI . 
The recip ient’s utility function can be expressed as 
 
(1) R=R(I, c, a) 
 
 where the recipient’s utility is an increasing function in the amount of aid. The recipient 
also derives a positive utility of having the plant built, but is indifferent as to which 
company gets what share of the contract. However, the recipient must decide to which 
company the contract is to be assigned. Since the recipient is trying to avoid implementing 
the conditions, it will apply the following rule: 
 
(2) If M < N donor-company pair chooses (no aid, home): divide the contract among 
the other companies.  
For all other histories: divide the contract equally among all companies. 
 
Since conditionality implies that aid is used to buy policy reform, we assume, 
ceteris paribus, that the recipient requires a certain amount of aid to be willing to implement 
the conditions ci, and that ai is larger than this amount.12 Hence,  
 
(3) ),,,,(),,,,( pi
not
i
t
i
not
i
p
i
gra
i
t
i
imp
i aaccIRaaccIR ---- >  inotgrapnotimpt "== ,,,,,  
 
                                                               
12 For empirical evidence on conditionality being imposed on unwilling recipients, see Mosley et al (1995) 
and Kanbur (2000). There are several reasons for such a disagreement, but the most cited is that 
implementation of the conditions would harm politically important groups in the recipient country, for 
instance through a change in relative prices as noted in Summers and Pritchett (1993).  
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where t ic-  and  
p
ia-  denotes the conditions and aid, respectively, for other donors than 
Donori.  
 
(4)     ),,( iiiii scaDD =  
 
where, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that Di is a differentiable function in ai. We 
assume that Donori has an increasing utility of granting aid if the recipient has implemented 
ic , that is, Donori’s own conditions. To simplify the disposition, it is assumed that Donori is 
indifferent to other donors’ grants as well as to whether or not the recipient implements the 
other donors’ conditions. Incorporating Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) findings that giving 
aid is a waste if the conditions are not implemented, Donori is assumed to have a decreasing 
utility of granting aid if the recipient has abstained from implementation. In sum  
 
(5) 
ïî
ï
í
ì
=<
=>
¶
¶
not
ii
imp
ii
i
i
ccif
ccif
a
D
0
0
 
 
Donori is also better off when the recipient implements ci, everything else equal, hence 
 
(6) iscaDscaD i
not
iiii
imp
iii "> ,),,(),,(  
 
Then (5) and (6) formalize conditionality, and implies that the donor would, ceteris paribus, 
only give aid to a recipient that has implemented this donor’s conditions. We also assume 
that Donori’s utility increases with Companyi‘s activity in country i, and is also more 
concerned about this domestic activity of Companyi than about maintaining conditionality. 
Therefore, in a situation where the conditions are not implemented, Donori would grant the 
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aid to the recipient if the consequence of not disbursing the aid would be to lose the new 
activity )( uss -*  to another country. Thus, we assume that 
 
(7) iscaDscaD ui
not
i
not
iii
not
i
gra
ii ">
* ,),,(),,(  
 
If iC  denotes Companyi’s profit, then  
 
(8) ),( iiii sICC =  
   
We assume that each company maximizes profit, is risk neutral and has an increasing profit 
in the size of its share of the contract. Thus, the larger the number of companies which are 
to divide the contract, the lower the profit to Companyi: 
 
(9)      i
I
sIC
i
iii ">
¶
¶
,0
),(   
 
Note that, by definition, ),/(),/( uiiii sNICsNIC >
* . Assume now that Nmax is the number 
of companies for which Companyi is indifferent between making a location decision that is 
not optimal if, as a result, it receives 
MaxN
1  of the contract, rather than choosing an optimal 
location and be disqualified from any participation in the project. Hence, NMax is defined by  
 
(10) isCs
N
I
C i
u
maxi "=
* ,),0(),(  
 
Finally, assume that the company would rather locate abroad to secure the entire contract 
compared to locating at home and having 
N
1  of the contract: 
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(11) 2,,),(),( ³"<* NisICs
N
I
C uii  
 
3.2 Subgame perfect equilibria in triadic relations  
Assume now that N = 2 and that Nmax >2, which gives the potential interactions among the 
agents as depicted in figure 3 below (see the appendix for the general case). 
 
 
Fig. 3: Structure of the potential interaction among the players for N = 2. 
 
     Recipient 
           
Construction contract               Construction contract 
          
 Company1                  aid on            aid on          Company2 
   conditions                   conditions 
          
          location                location 
 
        Donor1   Donor2 
 
 
Now, let Companyi said to be cooperating with the recipient if it locates abroad in the case 
that Donori does not give aid, and not to be cooperating if it locates at home in this 
situation. From the recipient’s contract-allotting rule (2), all players know that the company 
that cooperates with the recipient will secure at least half of the contract. Moreover, the 
company that cooperates will have the entire contract if the other company does not 
cooperate. So if both donors refuse to give aid, we have a “prisoner’s dilemma” between 
the two companies where each company has incentives to cooperate with the recipient 
irrespective of whether or not the other company cooperates. To see that these incentives 
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induce the donors to disburse aid even if the conditions are not implemented, we solve the 
game by backward induction following the specified sequence of the game. 
 
Stage 4 
From (2), the recipient will choose to give the entire contract to Company1 (Company2) if 
Donor2 (Donor1) has refused to give aid at stage 2 and Company2 (Company1) has not 
located abroad, as long as Company1 (Company2) and Donor1 (Donor2) has not chosen the 
same actions: (no aid, home).  All other histories in this game will imply that each company 
will have 
2
I  of the contract.  
 
Stage 3 
Contingent upon the actions at stage 2, the following games represent the companies’ 
interaction at stage 3: 
 
A) Both donors have refused to give aid at stage 2. 
Then Companyi will have half of the contract if it takes on the cost of locating abroad 
and the other company does the same. In that case both will get ),2( ui sIC . If one 
company locates abroad and the other does not, then the one that cooperates with the 
recipient will get the whole contract and thus have ),( ui sIC , while the other’s payoff 
will be ),0( *sC i . If both companies refuse to cooperate with the recipient and locate at 
home, then the recipient divides the contract between them yielding 2I  to each. 
Formally: 
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From (9), (10) and the fact that 2max >N  , we know that ),0(),
2
( *> sCs
I
C i
u
i , and 
from (11) that ),
2
(),( *> s
I
CsIC i
u
i . Thus, if both donors have rejected disbursement 
of aid, then the companies play (at stage 3) a variant of the “prisoner’s dilemma” game 
with one unique Nash equilibrium where both companies choose to locate abroad and 
thus cooperate with the recipient. 
 
B) Only one donor has refused to give aid at stage 2. 
Assume now that Donor1 has rejected disbursement of aid at stage 2, and that Donor2 
has disbursed aid. According to (2), the recipient will give the entire contract to 
Company2 if Company1 locates at home in this situation, which would yield ),0(1
*sC  
to Company1 and ),(2
*sIC  to Company2 if it locates at home and ),(2
usIC  if it locates 
abroad. Note also that the recipient divides the contract equally between them if both 
locate abroad. The companies hence play the following game: 
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In the unique Nash equilibrium of this game, Company1 locates abroad to secure half of 
the contract (and Company2 locates at home). Thus, Donor1 is punished for not giving 
aid. Note also that symmetry implies that if Donor1 gives aid while Donor2 does not, 
then we will have that Company2 punishes Donor2 in the Nash equilibrium. 
 
C) Both donors give aid 
In this case, both companies will get half of the contract each, irrespective of their 
choices (from (2)). Thus, the following game is played in this situation: 
                                          Company 2 
                         Abroad                              Home 
 
),2(1
usIC  , ),2(2
usIC  
 
),2(1
usIC  , ),2(2
*sIC  
 
 
 
 
Company 1 
              
Abroad 
               
Home 
 
),2(1
*sIC  , ),2/(2
usIC  
 
),2(1
*sIC  , ),2(2
*sIC  
In this case both companies choose to locate at home. 
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In sum, we know from the analysis of stage 3 that donors not disbursing aid will be 
punished. Thus, each donor’s best response at stage 2 is to give aid (see (7)), no matter 
what the other donor does and irrespective of the recipient’s implementation record at stage 
1. Then it follows that the recipient will not implement any conditions at stage 1, and still 
be sure of having the aid from both donors.  
 From this elaboration, we have that if the players have the following strategies: 
 
-the recipient’s strategy is to play “not implement” at stage 1, and follow the weak 
reciprocity rule when giving the contract(s) at stage 4. 
-Donori’s strategy is to always play “give aid” at stage 2. 
-Companyi ’s strategy is to play, at stage 3, “at home” if the donor gives aid, and 
“abroad” if the donor plays “no aid” 
 
then these strategies yield a subgame perfect equilibrium under our assumptions. 
It is evident that any deviation from any single agent from its strategy would lead to 
a worse outcome for the deviating agent. Hence, conditionality fails in the subgame perfect 
equilibrium, and the recipient is able to get the aid without implementing the conditions by 
making the companies put pressure on the donors towards disbursement. Note that the 
result can be maintained even if we assume a larger number of donor-company pairs, see 
the appendix for a discussion.  
  
3.3 The dyadic outcome 
To see that the triadic structure is crucial in this explanation for the failure of conditionality, 
assume that the players only are allowed to interact pair-wise. Hence, we remove the “weak 
reciprocity” assumption in (2) since this rule is triadic by definition. Recall that 
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conditionality should be maintained from Donori’s point of view. Thus, from (5) and (6) we 
know that aid is only disbursed in an isolated recipient-donor interaction as long as the 
conditions are implemented. Then from (3) we know that the recipient will implement the 
conditions to get aid in such a two-party relationship.  
However, we must also take account of the recipient’s relationship with the 
company. Since the recipient does not let the donor-company relationships affect its 
decisions in dyadic relations, the recipient is indifferent to any division of the contract 
among the companies. The contract can thus be seen as randomly allotted. Then there will 
be no gain for Companyi from influencing Donori, and Companyi locates at home. Thus, 
the recipient’s relationship with the company will not influence the interaction between the 
recipient and the donor, so the recipient implements the conditions ci to get aid ai, for all i. 
It is evident that conditionality becomes successful in the dyadic game. Compared 
to the triadic equilibrium, the donors are better off because conditiona lity works as 
intended, which in turn implies that the recipient is worse off. Donori achieves D( aigra, 
ciimp, si*) in the dyadic equilibrium, which is clearly better than receiving D( aigra, cinot, si*) 
from the triadic outcome. Since the donor believes that giving aid when the conditions are 
not implemented is a waste, the donor is actually taking a loss in the triadic equilibrium 
compared to the situation where the recipient is not able to use the companies in a strategic 
manner. The donor is forced to take this loss because not giving aid causes a larger loss 
when the company punishes the donor in order to secure a share of the construction 
contract. The recipient will have R(I, cimp, agra) in the dyadic game, but is better off in the 
triadic equilibrium because it avoids implementing the conditions: R(I, cnot, agra). The 
payoff to the companies depends on the allocation of the contract and the difference 
between the dyadic and triadic company-payoff is therefore undetermined. 
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Since the opportunity to divide the contract between the companies plays an 
important role in these games, it is necessary to raise the issue of the nature of the marginal 
costs of splitting a contract among different entrepreneurs. In the analysis in the previous 
sections, we have assumed that there are no costs for the recipient of letting more 
companies share the contract. As there could be both decreasing and increasing costs for 
the recipient, dependent on the type of project that is contracted, this assumption needs to 
be explored further. This is the topic of the next two sections. 
 
3.4 Increasing costs of splitting the contract 
When various tasks within a construction project are complicated to coordinate, or for 
capital investments with large start-up costs, there may be increasing costs of granting 
different parts of the project to several different entrepreneurs. The more coordination 
needed between the different parties (or the larger the start-up costs) that would have been 
avoided if a single entrepreneur were given the entire enterprise, the larger the costs for the 
recipient of letting more companies have a share of the contract. To analyze the implication 
for the triadic equilibrium, suppose that we change the triadic game in sections 3.1 and 3.2 
so that the costs are increasing in the number of companies that get a share of the contract. 
 It is evident that increasing  costs in the number of entrepreneurs that undertake the 
project make it optimal for the recipient to give the entire contract to one single company. 
In the situation with N company-donor pairs, assume then that the recipient’s contract 
allotting rule is changed to 
 
(12) If M < N donor-company pair choose (no aid, home): assign the contract randomly 
to one of the other companies.  
For all other histories: assign the contract randomly to one of the N companies. 
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Hence, the recipient still adheres to a weak reciprocity rule in that it will punish the 
companies that does not cooperate if it can do this at no cost.13 The main difference from 
the elaboration in section 3.2 lies in the uncertainty with regard to the reward to the 
company for punishing the donor. If Donori does not disburse aid, then Companyi is not 
certain of being paid for locating abroad. Companyi will only be entitled to the possibility 
of being allotted the contract if it cooperates with the recipient. Working backwards for 
N=2 gives the following result: 
 
Stage 4 
From (12), the recipient will give the contract to Companyj if Donori has refused to give aid 
at stage 2 and Companyi has located at home, as long as Companyj and Donorj did not 
choose equal actions; (no aid, home). All other histories in this game will imply that each 
company has a fifty percent chance of winning the contract. 
 
Stage 3 
Contingent upon the actions at stage 2, the following games represent the companies’ 
interaction at stage 3: 
 
A) Both donors have refused to give aid at stage 2. 
Then Companyi will have a fifty percent chance of having the contract if it takes on the cost 
of locating abroad in a situation where the other company does the same. In that case, both 
will get an expected payoff of ),0(
2
1
),(
2
1
][ ui
u
i
b
i sCsICCE += . If one company locates 
abroad and the other does not, then the one that cooperates with the recipient will get the 
                                                               
13 Recall that Company i is not cooperating if it  does not locate abroad if Donori does not give aid, and 
cooperating in all other circumstances. 
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whole contract and thus achieve ),( ui sIC , while the other will get ),0(
*sC i . If both 
companies refuse to cooperate with the recipient and locate at home, then the recipient 
grants the contract randomly, which yields an expected payoff 
),0(
2
1
),(
2
1
][ ** += sCsICCE ii
a
i  to each. Formally: 
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Then we impose this section’s parallel to condition (10) in section 3.1. Each company’s 
expected payoff from moving abroad and having a ticket to the contract lottery must be 
higher than the payoff of locating at home and be certain of not having the contract. Thus,  
 
(13)  ),0(][ *> sCCE i
b
i   
 
Further, if both companies choose to ignore the recipient’s demands and locate at home, 
then both will have a fifty percent chance of having the contract. However, if one of the 
companies locates abroad while the other does not, then the former company will have the 
contract with certainty. Hence, if 
 
(14)  ),(][ ui
a
i sICCE <  
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is satisfied, then we have the same type of prisoner’s dilemma game as in section 3.2. Thus, 
assume that both (13) and (14) are satisfied and let them replace (10) and (11). Then both 
companies locate abroad if both donors reject disbursement of aid. 
 
B) Only one donor has refused to give aid at stage 2. 
Assume now that Donor1 has rejected disbursement of aid at stage 2, and that Donor2 
has granted aid. According to (12), the recipient will give the contract to Company2 if 
Company1 locates at home in this situation, which would yield ),0(1
*sC  to Company1 
and ),( 22
*sIC  to Company2 if it locates at home and ),( 22
usIC  if it locates abroad. 
Note also that each company has a fifty percent chance of having the contract if both 
locate abroad. The companies hence play the following game: 
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Since (12) is assumed, Company1 locates abroad to secure the possibility of having the 
contract. Company2’s best response is to locate at home, and hence, both have a fifty 
percent chance of having the contract. Then Donor1 is punished for not giving aid, 
while Donor2 is rewarded for giving aid by having the location to its own country. Note 
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also that symmetry implies that if Donor2 does not give aid while Donor1 does, then we 
will have that Company2 punishes Donor2. 
 
C) Both donors give aid 
In this case, both companies have fifty percent chance of having the contract 
irrespective of their choices (from (12)). Thus, we know from section 3.2 that both 
companies choose to locate at home. 
 
The crucial point in the analysis is that Companyi will locate abroad if Donori does not 
disburse aid. Thus, the remaining stages of this game are identical to section 3.2, so both 
donors will give aid even if the recipient does not implement any conditions. The 
equilibrium path is then that the recipient start out by not implementing the conditions at 
stage 1, both donors give aid at stage 2, both companies locate at home at stage 3, and the 
contract is randomly assigned to one of the companies at stage 4.  
 
3.5 Decreasing costs of splitting the contract 
Some types of construction work can be more effectively accomplished by dividing the 
work among different companies, at least up to a certain number of entrepreneurs. Assume 
now that there are decreasing costs of dividing the contract among the companies. In this 
situation, it is optimal for the recipient at stage 4 to grant an equal share of the project 
N
1  
to each of the companies. This can be interpreted as there being a cost for the recipient of 
denying one company a share of the contract. Hence, at stage 4, the recipient will choose to 
divide the construction project equally among the companies to minimize the costs, 
irrespective of previous actions of any other player. Then no company will profit from 
putting pressure on the donor, and Companyi will always choose to locate in country i. 
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Since there is no pressure towards disbursement, we know from section 3.3 that Donori will 
grant aid at stage 2 only if the recipient has implemented the conditions ci. The recipient 
will therefore implement the conditions at the first stage to secure aid. Declining costs in 
the number of entrepreneurs that undertake the project imply that the recipient is not able to 
influence the companies to put pressure on the donors towards disbursement. Hence, 
conditionality becomes successful. 14  
 
4. Discussion 
Several studies have found that bilateral donors frequently direct aid to particular countries 
based on strategic considerations. Examples of such donor-recipient bindings can be French 
support to the earlier French colonies, US assistance to Egypt and Israel and Japan’s 
favoring of countries that have the same UN voting pattern as themselves. Such bindings 
have received criticism, mainly because there are no incentives for the poor country to 
reform when aid keeps flowing irrespective of the recipient’s policies (Alesina and Dollar, 
2000, Collier and Dollar 2002). It is argued that one should have no pre-determined 
recipients of aid, and identify the reformers ex ante, so that aid can be granted based on 
earlier achievements. 
There are several reasons for these bindings, and Alesina and Dollar (2000) suggest 
that the most important one seems to be strategic interests in foreign policy, colonial past 
and commitment to help the poorest countries. However, our model offers a different 
interpretation for the rationale of these bindings. In some cases it would be in the donor’s 
own interest to keep aid flowing to a poor country because of the potential loss that may 
                                                               
14 However, we know from Villanger (2002) that for N=1 the recipient is able to get aid without 
implementing the conditions when there are costs of punishing the company if we allow the game to be 
repeated in infinitely and if the recipient offers a favorable contract. In our game, when N=2, the recipient 
could offer both the companies a contract that is better than the market based contract only if they put 
pressure on the donor in the donor specific punishment path, and the ordinary contract if they do not. Due to 
the usual constraints, however, elaboration on this idea must be left for future research. 
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arise if domestic companies are disqualified from contracts with the recipient. In this 
situation the standard recommendations of channeling aid towards good reformists (see 
Burnside and Dollar 2000, Alesina and Dollar 2000, Collier and Dollar 2002) would not be 
desirable from the donor’s point of view: The donor is locked into the triadic relationship 
with this particular recipient, not because of characteristics of the recipient, but because of 
the important role of the companies. Selectivity, or switching aid towards other recipients 
based on their policy record, can be interpreted in our model as the donor refusing to 
disburse aid. Hence, in our model selectivity does not make a difference because the 
donor’s problem remains the same. 
Our model is consistent both with regard to the evidence that aid is granted 
independently of implementation record of the recipients (failure of conditionality), and to 
the findings that particular donor countries support particular recipients. Note however, that 
any deeper study of the empirical basis for our model needs to take into consideration the 
strained relationships between the donor  and recipients if such triadic pressure is employed. 
The difference between this kind of triadic extortion and blackmail seems not very clear, so 
careful qualitative empirical work seems warranted. 
Other work on foreign aid has argued that one solution to  the failure of 
conditionality is to introduce recipient tournaments (Svensson 2002). Tournaments would 
imply that the recipient that goes the furthest in implementing the conditions would get 
most aid. Following this line of thinking we could introduce a second recipient with the 
same interests, investment project and relationship to the other parties as the original 
recipient, and assume that each donor is free to choose any allocation of its aid budget 
between the two recipients. In our framework, this may result in a tug of war between the 
recipient and the donor that might be studied in a bargaining model. This line of reasoning, 
however, must be left to future research.  
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has examined how recipients can influence companies to put pressure on donors 
to disburse foreign assistance without implementing the conditions usually set for the grant. 
Others have explained the failure of aid conditionality by showing how time-
inconsistencies in foreign aid make commitment to conditionality impossible for altruistic 
donors. Our analysis suggests that conditionality may also fail when recipients strategically 
allocate contracts only to companies from countries that disburse aid. In order to secure 
contracts with the recipient, the companies will then use their power to create a pressure on 
the donors towards disbursement. If the donor is more concerned with its domestic 
industries (i.e. the consequences of not giving aid in this environment) than conditionality, 
then the recipient’s strategic selection of companies to undertake projects may cause the 
donor to give assistance even if the recipient does not implement the conditions. In contrast 
to earlier work, this is a time-consistent explanation for the failure, and does not depend on 
the altruism of donors.  
Since donors believe it is a waste to give aid when the conditions attached to this 
assistance are not implemented, we find that the donor is forced to take a loss when 
subjected to this type of strategic behavior. Hence, the donor would be better off never to 
involve itself in the aid-relationship, and one would expect that real- life donors would 
withdraw from the aid scene, at least over time. Donors subjected to such strategic behavior 
may change their preferences and be less interested in the recipient’s country, and this is 
consistent with the trend of reductions in the aggregate amount of foreign aid. 
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Appendix A.  Equilibrium when N > 2 
 
The backward induction for max,2 NN Î , is as follows: 
 
Stage 4 
From (2), for any i, the recipient will not give any share of the contract to Companyi if 
Donori has refused to give aid at stage 2 and Companyi has located at home, as long as at 
least one other donor-company pair has taken other actions than (no aid, home).  All other 
histories in this game will imply that the contract will be divided among N companies, 
which implies that Companyi will have 
N
I  of the contract. 
 
Stage 3 
Contingent upon the actions at stage 2, the following games represent the companies’ 
interaction at stage 3: 
 
(A) All donors have refused to give aid at stage 2. 
To consider Companyi’s choice, assume that ]1,0 -Î NM  companies locate abroad. 
Then joining the M companies and locating abroad results in ),
1
( ui sM
I
C
+
 to 
Companyi, while locating at home yields ),0( *sC i .  From (10) we have that 
),
1
( ui sM
I
C
+
> ),0( *sC i  since 
maxNNM <-£ 1 , so Companyi locates abroad. To see 
that this is also the case when all companies has located at home, assume that M=0. 
Then Companyi will have the entire contract by locating abroad, which results in 
),( ui sIC . By locating at home in this situation, all companies will share the contract, 
which yields ),( *s
N
I
Ci . From (11), ),(
u
i sIC > ),(
*s
N
I
Ci , which implies that 
Companyi locates abroad even if all other companies has located at home. Thus, we 
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have a prisoner’s dilemma structure where it is always better for Companyi to locate 
abroad if all donors have refused to disburse aid, irrespective of the other companies’ 
choices. 
 
(B) If 1-£ NM  donors have refused to give aid at stage 2. 
 
Scenario 1: Donori is among the M donors that have rejected disbursement of aid. 
Assume that [ ]1,0ˆ -Î MM  companies from the countries tha t refused to give aid 
locate at home. Then the recipient will give the contract to the other companies. 
Thus, Companyi will have ),0( *sC i  by locating at home, for all Mˆ . On the other 
hand, if Companyi locates abroad in line with the MM ˆ-  other companies from the 
M donors that rejected disbursement, then the contract is shared with all companies 
that complies; MN ˆ- . Thus, Companyi will have ),ˆ
( ui s
MN
I
C
-
 and locates 
abroad in this situation since ),
ˆ
( ui s
MN
I
C
-
> ),0( *sC i  from (10). Hence, all M 
companies will locate abroad.  
 
 
Scenario 2: Donori is among the N-M donors that granted aid. 
In this case it is always Companyi’s best response to locate at home because 
locating abroad never has any purpose when Donori has granted the aid. 
 
So if Donori has granted (not granted) aid, Companyi’s best response is to locate at 
home (abroad). Thus, the donors that do not disburse aid will be punished. 
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C) All donors give aid  
In this case, all companies will get
N
I  irrespective of their choices, so every company 
locates at home. 
 
Then it follows from the results in section 3.2 that the recipient will not implement any 
conditions because all donors will grant aid irrespective of the recipient’s implementation 
record.  
Note that the larger the number of companies competing for a share of the contract, 
the less is the chance that each particular company will see it as worthwhile to put pressure 
on the donor. So if N > N max does no longer hold, there would be no scope for the recipient 
to make the companies put pressure on the donor, and then we know from section 3.3 that 
conditionality will work. 
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Appendix B: Increasing costs of dividing the contract when N > 2 
 
Assume first that (12) describes the recipient’s decision rule, and that all donors have 
refused to give aid. To be willing to punish in this situation, Companyi must have a higher 
expected payoff from locating abroad and having the entire contract with probability 
MN -
1  if [ ]1,0 -Î NM  donor-company pairs chooses (no aid, home), compared to 
locating at home and be disqualified from the contract assignment with certainty. Formally, 
this condition can be stated as  
 
(15)
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and assume that it is satisfied.  
Also, it must be in Companyi’s interest to punish Donori if every donor refuses to 
disburse aid, even if all the other companies does not punish. Assume then that all donors 
have refused to disburse aid and that the companies have agreed that all should locate at 
home at stage 3. In this case, Companyi would have the entire contract if it locates abroad. 
Then assume that the payoff to Companyi of locating abroad in this situation is higher than 
to follow the agreement; 
 
(16) [ ] [ ] ),(),0()11(),(1 uiii sICsCNsICN <-+
**   , maxNNi <" ,  
 
Since every company would think in the same vain, the companies find themselves in a 
prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, the agreement of locating at home is not credible, and all 
  35 
companies would locate abroad if all donors did not disburse aid. This implies that the 
probability for each company of having the contract is 
N
1  in this situation.  
If (12), (15) and (16) replace (2), (10) and (11), then all donors know that if they do 
not give aid, they will be punished even when there are increasing costs of dividing the 
contract. Hence, if the model in section 3.1-3.2 is modified by the assumptions in this 
section, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in this adjusted model where the 
recipient can neglect the conditions and still have aid.  
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Summary 
Despite the importance attached to conditionality by the donors, 
and the fact that aid is a crucial income source for the recipient,  
it is found that conditionality fails. One explanation for this 
failure could be that a halt in aid could trigger the recipient to 
cancel contracts with companies from donor countries, which 
creates incentives for the companies to put pressure towards aid 
disbursement. We use a multi-agent triadic model of the 
relationships between a recipient and two donors and two 
companies to illustrate that recipients may use contracts 
strategically to make companies influence the disbursement 
decision to avoid implementing the donors’ conditions. Failing 
to take account of the companies’ role yields the opposite result 
in this model, i.e., conditionality becomes successful.  
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